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Abstract   This paper investigates the strategic effects of new entry into product markets in a 
unionized oligopoly where entry and wage negotiations are sequential. When both a domestic 
incumbent and a foreign entrant hire unionized workers, the incumbent has incentives to raise the 
wage, because a higher wage strengthens the bargaining position of the union relative to the entrant at 
subsequent negotiations when entry occurs. Such a high wage offer may then discourage the potential 
entrant to enter the market. We also extend the model to allow the foreign entrant to supply the good 
to the domestic market either by foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports. Under FDI the entrant 
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1.   Introduction 
It is often argued that labor unions may be an entry barrier in the product market because 
potential entrants anticipate high wages to be settled at post-entry negotiations. For instance, 
using data of U.S. industries, Chappell, Kimenyi, and Mayer (1992) find that unionization 
has a statistically significant entry-deterring effect. Dewatripont (1987, 1988) introduces 
labor unions in the standard entry-deterrence models of sunk cost and limit pricing (e.g., 
Dixit 1980; Eaton and Lipsey 1980; Milgrom and Roberts 1982), and studies the relationship 
between sunk capital and unionization and their different roles in entry deterrence.  
This paper takes a step further by demonstrating that the incumbent may welcome 
relatively strong and wage-oriented labor unions in oligopolistic markets. By taking 
advantage of the strategic effects of entry deterrence, an incumbent firm may benefit from a 
union being strong than weak because the former takes away more rents from a new entrant 
firm in subsequent negotiations. We believe this finding to be novel in the literature.  
Consider that a foreign entrant seeks to enter the product market in which a home 
incumbent already operates and all workers are unionized. The incumbent first bargains with 
the union over the wage. Then, the entrant decides whether to enter or not, and must also hire 
unionized workers and negotiate with the union over wages when it enters. Finally the firms 
choose outputs simultaneously. The bargaining sequence is dictated by the fact that the 
incumbent already operates in the market and the potential entrant seeks to enter. 
Wage bargaining is modeled in a simple way: the firms (incumbent and entrant) make 
“take-it-or-leave-it” wage offers to the union sequentially.  Although the union has no powers 
to set wages, a high wage may become the negotiation outcome, which arises when the 
outside-option value of the union is high. In a sense, the “bargaining power” of the union is   2
determined by its outside-option value. Then, by offering high wages, the incumbent can 
raise the outside-option value of the union relative to the entrant, and subsequently induce the 
entrant to offer high wages as well, which in turn discourages the entrant to enter the market 
by anticipating lower post-entry profits.  
In fact we will show that when the union has a wage-oriented preference with relatively 
higher utility weight on wages than employment, the settled wage at post-entry negotiations 
between the entrant and union is increasing in the predetermined wage at the earlier 
negotiation between the incumbent and union. Thus, in sharp contrast to the standard result, 
the post-entry profit of the entrant is decreasing in the incumbent-union negotiated wage. 
Such a strategic effect of raising wages may dominate the direct effect that high wages 
reduce the incumbent’s profit, resulting in a high equilibrium wage that can deter entry.  
In an extended model, we allow the entrant to have either of two options: one is to build 
a plant in the domestic market (foreign direct investment, hereafter FDI), and the other is to 
produce the goods in the foreign country and import them to the domestic country. This 
extended model may also be viewed as a location choice game in which the entrant chooses 
where to build the plant. In this structure, entry of the foreign firm cannot be deterred 
because it enters either by FDI or exports, and thus, in contrast to the previous model, the 
market structure is always a duopoly.  
In this setting we show that the equilibrium wage offered by the incumbent becomes 
lower when the entrant can choose between both FDI and export options than when it has no 
options to export/import. This is because the outside-option payoff of the entrant, which is 
ensured when FDI does not occur, becomes higher when it can export than when it has no 
such option. Further we provide a set of parameter values under which the above conditions   3
are satisfied and the incumbent can obtain higher equilibrium profits. Thus, in contrast to 
conventional wisdom, an incumbent firm may benefit from rival firms having multiple 
production options. 
 Intuitively, in the absence of labor unions, the incumbent loses if the entrant has more 
options. Under unionization, the entrant’s added option of importing from a foreign country 
lowers the negotiated wage when the entrant and the union bargain, which enables the 
incumbent to offer a lower wage in a prior bargain as well. That is, the incumbent 
successfully passes the burden of the entrant’s added option to the labor union by offering a 
lower wage. This also implies that in unionized oligopolistic markets, if some firms can 
produce in a foreign country, wages in all firms will be driven down even though labor-
management negotiations in different firms are separate and independent. 
A few other papers have investigated the roles unions play in deterring entry. In an 
insider-outsider model of labor unions, Gollier (1991) studies a case where union insiders 
conspire with management to deter entry to secure high rents.  Ishiguro and Shirai (1998) 
assume that the entrant is not unionized. If it enters, the unionized monopoly’s market share 
is taken away, resulting in lower industry rents. This threat renders the union willing to 
accept a lower wage. In Haucap, Pauly and Wey (2001), incumbents are assumed to be 
slightly more efficient (i.e., lower marginal costs) than potential entrants. Raising wages 
(industry-wide) can raise the rival’s cost and deter entry. Naylor (2002) shows profits can be 
increasing in the number of firms in the industry if wages are determined by bargaining in 
unionized bilateral oligopoly, because increased product market competition following an 
increase in the number of firms is mirrored by increased labor market rivalry which induces   4
wage moderation. In Lommerud, Meland and Sorgard (2003), trade liberalization can induce 
FDI because the firm uses FDI to battle with the union.  
The new feature of our paper is to consider the multilateral aspects of wage negotiations, 
where the union bargains with the entrant firm as well as the incumbent if the former enters 
the market, and the entrant can choose in which country to locate its production plant.  
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: In Section 2 we set up the 
basic model. In Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium of the game and show that the 
incumbent has incentives to raise wages to deter entry. In Section 4 we extend the model to 
allow the foreign firm to have both options of FDI and exports. And Section 5 includes some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.   Basic Model Setup 
Consider two firms competing in the domestic market. One is a home incumbent firm, 
already operating in the market. The other is a potential foreign entrant, seeking to enter the 
domestic market. If the entrant does enter, it must incur a fixed cost  0 C > . There is also a 
labor union in the market. Each firm must negotiate with the union over wages, separately. 
Denote the output of the incumbent (resp. entrant) by  0 ≥ x  (resp. 0 ≥ y ). For simplicity, one 
unit of labor is assumed to produce one unit of output. And the inverse demand function is 
linear such that,  ( ) ( ) P xy a xy += −+, where  0 a > .  
We assume that the union has the following utility function  
  () ( ) ( ) ie Uw vxy uwx u vy ,,, ≡ , + , ,  (1)   5
where  w  and  v   are wage rates the union receives from the incumbent and the entrant 
respectively, and  i u  and  e u  are the utilities coming from the wage and employment obtained 
by negotiation with the incumbent and entrant respectively. Specifically we assume a 
symmetric utility function,  ie uu u ≡=, and it takes the following familiar form which has 
been extensively used in the literature (see Oswald, 1985 and Pemberton, 1988), 
  () () uwx wx uvy vy
γγ , =, , =,  (2) 
where 0 γ >  is a parameter representing how much the union cares about the wage relative to 
employment. We say that the union is wage–oriented (resp. employment–oriented) if  1 γ >  
(resp. 1) γ <  (See Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991)).  
We consider the following 3-stage game:  
Stage 1. The incumbent (firm i) makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer w to the labor 
union, who then decides whether to accept it or not. If the union rejects it, then the 
incumbent’s profit becomes zero and the game goes to Stage 2.  
Stage 2. The entrant (firm e) decides whether to enter the product market or not. If it 
enters, it must incur the fixed cost  0 > C . The entrant also makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage 
offer v to the union, who then decides whether to accept it or not. If the union rejects it, then 
the entrant produces nothing.     
Stage 3. Finally, only the firms whose wage offers were accepted by the union can 
choose the outputs of a homogenous good simultaneously.  
A simple game tree can be drawn as follows.    6
Incumbent i makes offer 
Union accepts  Union rejects 
Entrant e makes offer  Entrant e makes offer 
Union accepts  Union accepts  Union rejects  Union rejects 
Duopoly  Monopoly i  Monopoly e  No production 
 
3.   Wage Raising Strategy 
In this section we solve the game described above by backward induction, and show 
that the incumbent raises the wage to be offered to the union under the threat of new entry.  
 
3.1. Equilibrium at the Third Stage 
First we solve the equilibrium at Stage 3, which has three interesting cases: duopoly 
by both firms, monopoly by the incumbent and monopoly by the entrant.  
 
Case (i): Duopoly. In this case, both firms succeeded in negotiation with the union at earlier 






aw v av w
xw v yw v
− +− +
,= , ,= ,  (3) 
provided  2 aw v ≥−  and  2 av w ≥−  are satisfied.  
Case (ii): Monopoly by the incumbent. This is the case when only the incumbent succeeded 
in negotiation with the union at Stage 1. Then, the incumbent chooses the monopoly output 







= . (4) 
Case (iii): Monopoly by the entrant. This case arises when only the entrant succeeded in 







= . (5) 
 
3.2.  Equilibrium at the Second Stage 
Having solved the game in Stage 3, now we consider the equilibrium at Stage 2. First 
suppose that the incumbent has succeeded in negotiation with the union at Stage 1. Suppose 
also that the entrant enters the market and makes a wage offer v to the union so as to solve 
the following problem:  
                  c c c c e
v vy y y x P w v − + ≡ Π
≥ ) ( ) , ( max
0    8
subject to   () () ( ) , ccm vy wv wx wv wx w
γγγ ,+ ,≥                  (ACE)  
where (ACE) is the acceptance constraint for the union, i.e., its left hand side is the total 
utility of the union when it accepts the entrant’s wage offer v, and its right hand side is only 
the utility  m wx
γ  when it rejects v. Note that by rejecting the wage offer v the union will 
obtain the following utility:  
  () m wx w
γ , (6) 
because it can now enjoy the wage w and the monopoly output (employment)  ( ) m x w  from 
the negotiation with the incumbent.  
Note that 
2 () (2 ) 9 e vw a v w Π ,=−+ /   and it is decreasing in v . Thus the entrant 
chooses the smallest wage v satisfying the constraint (ACE). In fact we can verify that the 
optimal wage v
∗   that solves the above problem is given by the smallest solution to the 






γ ∗ = . (7) 
To see this, note that both sides of (ACE) are equalized for all  2 / ) ( w a v + ≥  because  0 = c y  
holds. Besides these values, there exists a unique value v   at which (ACE) is binding: 
() () ( ) cc m vy wv wx wv wx w
γγγ ,+ ,= . The explicit solution is given in (7). Finally, since the 
profit of the entrant  ( ) e vw Π ,  is strictly decreasing in v, the optimal wage must be v
∗, which 
is the smallest solution to make (ACE) binding.    9
Let ) (
* * w v v = . Note that  ( ) vw w
∗ <  for all w , i.e., the entrant must offer a wage 
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() 0 ,    i f () 1 γ < >> < .  (9) 
Thus the profit of the entrant is decreasing in the incumbent wage offer w when the union is 
wage–oriented. This counterintuitive result comes from the “threat point” effect that a high 
wage offer w   may raise the threat point payoff of the wage–oriented union when it 
negotiates with the entrant, which in turn induces the latter to offer a high wage v as well.  
The net profit of the entrant after subtracting the entry fee  0 C >  is given by  
  (()) e vww C
∗ Π ,− .  (10) 
Then two cases arise depending on whether  ( ( ) ) e vww
∗ Π ,  is increasing or not (i.e.,  1 γ <  or 
1) γ >   as we have seen above. Suppose first that  1 γ >  (wage–oriented  union).  Then, 
(()) e vww C
∗ Π, −  is decreasing in w and there exists a cut off wage, denoted  ˆ 0 w > , at which  
  ˆˆ (()) 0 e vww C
∗ Π ,−= ,    10
provided ( (0) 0) 0 e vC
∗ Π, − > , which is equivalent to 
2 9 aC / > . If 
2 9 aC / < , then the entrant 
never enters the market. On the other hand, suppose that  1 γ <  (employment–oriented union). 
Then ( ( ) ) e vww C
∗ Π, −  is  increasing  in  w   and the cut off wage  ˆ 0 w >   exists at which 
ˆˆ (()) 0 e vww C
∗ Π, − = , given 
2 9 aC /< . If 
2 9 aC / >  then the entrant always enters.  
We summarize these results in the following lemma:  
 
Lemma 1. Consider the sub-game in which the incumbent has succeeded in negotiation with 
the union at Stage 1. Then, we obtain the following:   
Case (i) 
2 9 aC /> : The entrant enters the market if and only if  ˆ ww < , when  1 γ > ; while it 
always enters the market when  1 γ <.   
Case (ii) 
2 9 aC /< : The entrant enters the market if and only if  ˆ ww > , when  1 γ < ; while it 
never enters the market when  1 γ >.   
 
In fact, when  1 γ >  and 
2 9 aC / > , we can derive the explicit solution for  ˆ w:  
  ˆˆ (()) 0 e vww C
∗ Π ,−= , (11) 
 
11 2 {( 2 1 ) }9 aw C









 (13)   11
Next suppose that the negotiation between the incumbent and union has broken down 
at Stage 1. Then the entrant will offer the wage v such that the union accepts it, i.e.,  
  m vy u
γ ≥ , (14) 
where  0 u >   denotes the reservation payoff of the union obtained from other outside 
opportunities.
1 Observe that  ( ) 2 m vy v a v
γγ = −/  becomes zero at both  0 v =  and va = , and 
{( ) 2 } | 20 va dv a v d v a
γγ
= −// = −/ < and  0 {( ) 2 } | 0 v dv a v d v
γ
= − // ≥. Furthermore,  ( ) 2 vav
γ −/ is 
continuous in v. Thus we can find some  0 v >  at which  () 2 vav u
γ − /= . Taking the smallest 
one, denoted w, among those values if it is not unique, it is verified that w is the optimal 
wage offer the entrant makes, given that the negotiation between the incumbent and union 
has broken down at Stage 1. The entrant then obtains the (gross) monopoly profit 
()
m
em m m P yy w y Π≡ − . It follows that the entrant enters and offers w if  0
m
e C Π− >, and does 
not enter otherwise. In either case the union obtains the reservation payoff u .  
 
3.3.  Equilibrium at the First Stage 
Now consider the wage negotiation game at Stage 1. The incumbent offers a wagew to 
solve the following:  
Problem (IP):  
  () {( ) }( 1 () ) {( ) } max cc c c m m m
w
dw Px y x w x dw Px x w x +− + − −, 
                                                 
1 When the union has contracted with the incumbent on the wage w at Stage 1, it cannot run away at Stage 2 to 
obtain the reservation payoff u  because the contract agreement is enforceable.   12
subject to             ( ){ ( ) } (1 ( )){ } cc m dw wx v w y dw wx u
γγ γ ∗ ++ − ≥ ,             (ACI) 
where  () dw is an indicator function which takes one if the entrant enters and zero otherwise. 
The threat point payoff of the union is given by the outside utility u , because when 
negotiation with the incumbent breaks down, it obtains the outside utility u  if the entrant 
does not enter, and  () m wy w u
γ =  if it does enter and negotiates with the union, respectively. 
In either case the union will obtain the outside utility u  when it rejects the wage offer made 
by the incumbent. Then (ACI) says that the union will accept the incumbent’s wage offer. 
Here the left hand side of (ACI) corresponds to the utility of accepting the incumbent’s wage 
offer, in which case the union obtains the utility expressed in the first bracket when the 
entrant enters at the subsequent stage while it obtains the utility expressed in the second 
bracket when the entrant does not enter.  
By definition of  ( ) vw
∗ ,   ) ( )) ( , ( ) ( )) ( , (
* * * w x w w v w y w v w v w x w m c c
γ γ = +  holds  for 
any w. Thus (ACI) can be reduced to  
  () m wx w u
γ ≥ , (15) 
where ( ) ( ) 2 m xw aw =−/ .  
Since ( ) 0 m wx w
γ =  at both  0 w =  and  wa =  and  is  continuous in  w,
2 we can find 
some value  0 w >  at which  () m wx w u
γ = . By definition, this minimum wage equals to w. 
Note that w also corresponds to the equilibrium wage offered by the incumbent when entry 
                                                 
2   0 {( ) 2 } | 0 w dw a w d w
γ
= −/ / ≥ and  {( ) 2 } | 0 wa dw a w d w
γ
= − // < also hold. 
   13
is impossible at the outset (for example,  ) C = +∞ . Therefore the union’s utility is simply its 
reservation payoff u  if no new entry arises at all.  
Next we examine how equilibrium changes in the presence of entry. Let us define the 
profit functions of the incumbent, respectively in the cases of monopoly and Cournot 
duopoly, 
  () ( )
m
im m m wP x xw x Π≡ − , (16) 
  () ( )
c
ic c c c wP xy xw x Π≡ + − , (17) 
where ( 2 ( )) 3 c xa w v w
∗ =− + /  and  ( 2 ( ) ) 3 c ya v w w
∗ = −+ / . Under the linear demand 
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=/ − + 

1 (2 3) { 2 (1 2) } c x
γ / =/ − + / 0 < . (19) 
We now concentrate on the case that the wage offer is not trivial, i.e.,  ˆ ww > . 
Otherwise, it becomes always optimal for the incumbent to offer the minimum wage w, 
regardless of entry possibility. Then, the optimal wage w
∗ which solves the above problem 
(IP) is given as follows:  
 
Proposition 1. Suppose that  ˆ ww > . Then the equilibrium wage offer of the incumbent is 
characterized as follows: 
(i).  Wage-oriented union ( 1 > γ ):  
 










(ii). Employment-oriented union (1 < γ ): ww
∗ = . 
 
Proof. Suppose that  ˆ ww > . This means that  ˆ 0 w >  and  hence 
2 9 aC / >  (resp. 
2 9) aC /<  
must hold when  1 γ >  (resp.  1) γ < .  
Consider first the case of  1 γ > . Then the entrant enters the market if and only if 
ˆ ww <   by Lemma 1. Moreover, both  ( )
m
i w Π  and  ( )
c
i w Π  are  decreasing  in  w . Thus the 
incumbent’s profit becomes  ( )
m
i w Π  and  ( )
c
i w Π   if it offers wages  ˆ ww >  and  ˆ ww <  
respectively. Since  () ()
mc
ii ww Π> Π for  all  0 w ≥  and  w   is the minimum wage, the   15
incumbent respectively offers the wage  ˆ w (and hence deters entry) if  ˆ () ()
mc
ii ww Π≥ Π , and 
the wage w (and hence allows entry) otherwise.  
Next suppose that  1 γ < . Then, by Lemma 1 the entrant enters the market if and only 
if  ˆ ww > . Thus, since  ( ) ( )
mc
ii ww Π> Π  for all ww ≥ , and both 
m
i Π  and 
c
i Π  are decreasing in 
w, the incumbent offers the minimum wage w and deters entry.           Q.E.D.  
 
Note that when the union is wage–oriented ( 1) γ >  the “high wage”  ˆ ww >  may be 
the optimal wage offer to deter entry. This is in sharp contrast to the case that no entry is 
allowed at the outset ( ) C =+ ∞ . The intuition is as follows: First, the outside option value of 
the union,  ) (w x w m
γ , when it rejects the wage offer by the entrant, is increased by raising the 
wage  w slightly from the minimum wage w. Therefore, the entrant must offer a high wage 
when the incumbent and union have already settled at a high wage w  earlier. Indeed we have 
shown this is the case: The increase of the incumbent-union negotiated wage w  raises the 
negotiated wage v  in the bargain between the entrant and union when the union is wage-
oriented (See equation (8)). Thus the post-entry profit of the entrant is decreasing in the 
incumbent-union negotiated wage w , in contrast to the standard result.  
Some parametric restrictions are needed to ensure that the first case of Proposition 1 
actually occurs. Note that, since  ˆ w  is decreasing in C  and continuously varies from 0 to  
) 1 2 /(
/ 1 1 −
− γ a , we can find some C  such  that  ˆ ww >  for  all  (0 ) CC ∈ , (here we use the 
inequality  w a a > > −
− ) 1 2 /(
/ 1 1 γ ). Moreover,  () ()
mc
ii ww Π> Π. Thus, there exists some 
0 C >  such that for all  () CC C ∈, , we have  ˆ ww >  and  ˆ () ()
mc
ii ww Π> Π .    16
We also establish the following, which shows that the possibility of new entry 
benefits the union. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the union is wage–oriented ( ˆ 1) ww γ >,> and  ˆ () ()
m
ic ww Π> Π . 
Then in the presence of entry the union can obtain some positive “rent”,  m wx u
∗ > , even 
when it has no bargaining powers when negotiating the wage.  
 
  The intuition is, without the threat of entry, the union is always offered the minimum 
wage by the incumbent; while with the threat of entry, the incumbent offers a high wage to 
deter entry strategically, yielding positive rents to the union.  
 
4.   An Extension to International Duopoly with Imports  
Now we extend the model to the case that the incumbent is located in the home 
country, and the foreign entrant either produces directly in the home country (FDI) as in 
previous sections, or it produces in a foreign country and imports back to the home country 
for sales (export option). That is, the foreign firm always enters either way, and there is 
always a duopoly in the market. The new timing of the game has 4 stages as follows.  
Stage 1. The incumbent offers a wage w to the labor union. Then the union decides 
whether to accept this offer or not.  
Stage 2. The foreign entrant chooses either exports or FDI. Here the entrant is 
assumed to build only one plant either in the home country (i.e., the case of FDI) or the 
foreign country (i.e., the case of exports). The set up cost of building the plant in the home 
country (resp. foreign country) is denoted by  0 h C >  (resp.  0) f C > . We hereafter assume   17
that  hf CC > . This is a realistic assumption because the entrant faces more costs of setting up 
the plant in a foreign country than it does in its home country. 
Stage 3. If the entrant has decided to build the plant in the home country (FDI), it  
offers a wage v to the labor union. Then the union decides whether to accept it or not.  
Stage 4.  There are two possible cases. (i). The Case of FDI: If both wage offers w 
and v are accepted by the union, then the incumbent and the entrant simultaneously choose 
their outputs x and  y  in the Cournot fashion. If only wage offer w (resp.  ) v  is accepted, 
the incumbent (resp. entrant) chooses the monopoly output.   (ii). The Case of Exports: If the 
incumbent’s wage offer w   is accepted by the union at Stage 1, then both firms (the 
incumbent and the entrant) simultaneously choose their outputs x and  y . If the union rejects 
the offer w, then only the entrant chooses the monopoly output y . In the case of export the 
entrant incurs the competitive wage v per unit of output, which is determined in the labor 
market of the foreign country and exogenously given in this model. 
We will first solve the equilibrium in Stage 4. As before, the equilibrium profits of 


















Π, ≡ .  (21) 
Here the definitions of  ( ) i wv Π,  and  ( ) e wv Π ,  also cover the case that one firm becomes a 
monopolist because the other firm fails to negotiate with the union. For example, we obtain   18
() 0 i wv Π, =  and 
2 () ( ) 4 e wv a v Π ,=− /, by defining the wage () 2 wa v ≡ +/, when the 
incumbent’s wage offer w was rejected but the entrant’s offer v was accepted by the union 
earlier.  Furthermore,  () i wv Π, and  () e wv Π ,   represent the equilibrium profits of the 
incumbent and the entrant respectively when the incumbent’s wage offer w was accepted by 
the union and the entrant decided to import the product to the home country.  
Next we consider the wage offer v by the entrant when it chooses FDI. This problem 
is equivalent to the previous analysis without the export option. The entrant will offer the 
wage v as the smallest solution to make the constraint (ACE) binding:  
  () () ( ) ccm vy wv wx w v wx w
γγγ , +, = .  (22) 
Note here that when the union rejects the entrant’s wage offer v, it obtains utility 
() m wx w
γ  from bargaining only with the incumbent, who then becomes the monopolist in the 
market. This is because the entrant keeps only one plant either in the home country or in the 
foreign country, and hence it cannot produce any outputs when it has the plant in the former 
country but negotiations with the union break down. Then, as before, the optimal wage offer 
v
∗ is given by (7). Thus, provided v
∗ is accepted by the union, the entrant chooses FDI if 
and only if  
  (( ) ) ( ) eh e f wv w C wv C
∗ Π, −> Π, −.  (23) 
In the following analysis we focus on the case of wage–oriented union ( 1) γ > . As we 
have already known, the left hand side of (23) is decreasing in w if  1 γ > . Its right hand side 
is however increasing in w. Thus there exists a unique value of w, denoted 0 ~ ≥ w , such that   19
inequality (23) holds as equality, given   f e h e C v C v − Π ≥ − Π ) , 0 ( )) 0 ( , 0 (
*  (otherwise, the 
left hand side of (23) is always greater than its right hand side for all  0 ≥ w
3). Of course, 
(( ) ) ( ) ( ) eh e f wv w C wv C
∗ Π, −> < Π, −  if and only if  () ww < > % . It follows that the entrant 
chooses FDI if and only if ww < % , when the union is wage–oriented ( 1) γ > . This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 where the upward (resp. downward) sloping curve represents the 
function  f e C v w − Π ) , ( ( r e s p .   h e C w v w − Π )) ( , (
* ) with respect to w.  
At Stage 1, when the wage offer w is accepted by the union and the entrant chooses 
FDI (i.e.,  ) ww < % , the incumbent’s profit becomes  
 
* (( ) ) i wv w Π, . (24a) 
On the other hand, it becomes  
  () i wv Π ,,  (24b) 
when the wage offer w is accepted by the union and the entrant chooses export (i.e.,  ) ww ≥ % .  
Now consider the acceptance decision of the union at Stage 1. First suppose that the 
union accepts the wage offer w by the incumbent. If ww < % , the entrant chooses FDI and 
offers the wage  ( ) vw
∗  at Stage 3. In this case the union obtains utility  ( ) m wx w
γ  by (22). If 
ww > % , then the entrant decides to export and the union obtains utility  () c wx wv
γ , . Hence the 
union will finally obtain the following utility by accepting the incumbent’s wage offer w:  
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Next note that when the union rejects the wage offer w proposed by the incumbent at 
Stage 1 it obtains the reservation utility u   irrespective of the subsequent choice of the 
entrant: In the case of export there exist no wage bargains; and in the case of FDI the entrant 
offers the minimum wage w to the union. In either case the union will obtain u . Thus the 
union accepts the wage offer w if and only if  () Uw u
∗ ≥ . Let 
* w  denote the minimum wage 
w such that  () Uw u
∗ ≥  holds.  
Since the entrant has the export option, the incumbent obtains the Cournot–Nash 
equilibrium profit  () i wv Π ,   even when the entrant does not build the plant in the home 
country by FDI. As  ( ) vw
∗  is increasing in w, we find a unique wage level of w, denoted 
0 w , 
such that  () () vw v
∗ ><  if and only if 
0 () ww >< . Moreover, since  hf CC > , when  0 ~ > w , by 
(23) we derive  
  ) , ~ ( ) , ~ ( )) ~ ( , ~ (
* v w C C v w w v w e f h e e Π > − + Π = Π , (26) 
which shows 
*() vw v < % . Since v
∗ is increasing, we have 
0 ww < % .  
Furthermore, both  ( ( )) i wv w
∗ Π,  and  () i wv Π ,  are decreasing in w. Also, we obtain 
() ( ) ( ( ) ) ii wv wv w
∗ Π, ≥ < Π,  if and only if 
0 ) ( w w > ≤ , because  v w v ) ( ) (
* < ≥  if and only if 
0 ) ( w w < ≥ , and  ) , ( v w i Π  is increasing in the second argument. Since the entrant decides to 
enter the market by FDI if and only if  () ww ≤ > % , the incumbent’s profits become   21
)) ( , (
* w v w i Π  for ww < %  and  ) , ( v w i Π  for  ww ≥ %  respectively. Together with the condition 
that 
0 ww < % , the incumbent chooses either the minimum wage 
* w  or high wage w % .  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2: the two curves  ) , ( v w i Π  and  )) ( , (
* w v w i Π  are downward sloping and 
cross only once at 
0 w . Since w %  is the cut-off wage to change the entry decision of the 
foreign entrant, the bold parts of these curves represent the profit function of the incumbent. 
It is clear from the figure that it will offer either the minimum wage 
* w  or the high wage w %  
depending on whether 
* ww > %  or not. Thus we establish:  
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that the foreign entrant has both options of FDI and exports, and 
that the union is wage-oriented ( 1 γ > ). Then, when 
* ww > % is satisfied, the domestic 
incumbent offers the minimum wage 
* w   to induce the entrant to choose FDI if 
** * (,() ) ( , ) ii wvw w v Π> Π %   and the high wage w % to induce the entrant to export otherwise 
respectively. When
* ww ≤ %  is satisfied, the incumbent always offers the minimum wage 
* w to 
induce the entrant to export.    
 
Since  ˆ ww < % , the incumbent may offer a lower wage to deter FDI when the entrant 
has both FDI and export options than when it has only FDI option. This result implies that in 
unionized oligopolistic markets, if some firms can produce in a foreign country, wages in all 
firms will be driven down even though labor-management negotiations in different firms are 
separate and independent.   22
Note also that the minimum wage 
* w defined in the extended model is not less than 
the one defined in the previous model without export option, w. This is because the utility of 
the union defined by  ) (
* w U  is not greater than  ) (w x w m
γ , which is the utility of the union 
obtained when no export option exists.  
  Now we show a set of parameter values under which the incumbent can obtain a 
higher equilibrium profit when the entrant has the export option than when it has no such 
option. Thus, in contrast to the standard argument, there exists a case that the incumbent can 
become better off when the entrant has more production options. To see this, it will be 
helpful to consider separately two distinct cases in equilibrium, one is that entry arises and 
the other is that entry is blocked (see Section 3).  
          First, consider the model without export option and suppose that the incumbent offers 
the minimum wage w   to allow the entrant to enter the market. Then the incumbent’s 
equilibrium profit becomes  9 / )) ( 2 ( )) ( , (
2 * * w v w a w v w i + − = Π   by Proposition 1. Next 
consider when the entrant has both options of FDI and export, as analyzed in this section. 
Suppose that 
* ww ≤ % is satisfied so that the incumbent offers the minimum wage 
* w and the 
entrant chooses to export (Proposition 3). In this case, the incumbent’s equilibrium profit 
becomes 
** 2 (, )( 2 ) / 9 i wv a w v Π= − + . Now assume that the reservation utility u  is set equal 
to zero. Then we have  0
* = = w w ,
4 and  
  9 / )) 0 ( , 0 ( 9 / ) ( ) , 0 (
2 * 2 a v v a v i i = Π > + = Π , 
                                                 
4 The case of 
* ww ≤ %  here is consistent with the assumption  0 = u . For example, when the entrant always 
enters the market by export for all  0 ≥ w , because in such a case we have 
* 0 ww = = % .    23
i.e., the incumbent can obtain a higher equilibrium profit when the entrant has both options of 
FDI and export than when it has only the FDI option. 
This result stems from the fact that even though the market structures are duopoly in 
both models, the incumbent gains a cost advantage against the entrant when the latter obtains 
the export option. Specifically, it arises because both wages of the incumbent and entrant are 
set to zero in the former case,  0 ) (
* = = w v w , leading to a lower market price, while in the 
latter case the entrant faces an exogenously fixed wage at  0 > v  but the wage set by the 
incumbent is zero,  0
* = w , leading to a cost advantage of the incumbent relative to the 
entrant. In other words, the added export option of the entrant induces the incumbent to offer 
the minimum wage in earlier, resulting in a cost advantage for the incumbent.   
           The second, and more interesting, case is that in the model without export option the 
incumbent offers a high wage w ˆ  to deter entry. In this case, since entry by FDI is blocked, 
the market structure becomes a monopoly by the incumbent (i.e., the first case of Proposition 
1). However, if the entrant has the export option, the market structure becomes a duopoly 
because the entrant can produce the goods in the foreign country and export to the domestic 
market. Thus, since the market structures are different in the two models, comparison 
between the incumbent’s equilibrium profits is not straightforward. However, in the 
following proposition, we provide a parametric example which gives the sufficient conditions 
for the incumbent’s profit to be increased by the entrant having both FDI and export options.  
 
Proposition 4. There exists a non-empty set of parameter values for which the following is 
true: (i) The incumbent offers the equilibrium wage w ˆ  to deter entry when the entrant has   24
only the FDI option. (ii) The incumbent’s equilibrium profit becomes higher when the entrant 
has both FDI and export options than when it has only the FDI option.  
  
Proof. We maintain the assumption that the union is wage-oriented, 1 γ > .  
First we set  h C  to satisfy  
(0 ) (0 (0)) ef e h vC v C
∗ Π ,− ≥ Π, − ,                (27) 
which, since  (0) 0 v
∗ = , gives  
 
9
) ( 4 v a v
C C f h
−
+ ≥ . (28) 
In this case, since  () e wv Π ,  is increasing in w and  (( ) ) e wv w
∗ Π,  is decreasing in w if  1 γ > , 
we obtain  () ( ( ) ) ef e h wv C wv w C
∗ Π, −≥ Π, − for all  0 w ≥ . It follows that the entrant always 
decides to export for all  0 w ≥  (we can define  0 w = %  in this case and, hence, 
* ww ≤ %  trivially 
holds). By the last statement of Proposition 3, the incumbent offers the minimum wage 
* w  at 








= . (29) 
In the following we will assume that 0 u = . In this case  0
* = w  and  9 / ) (
2 v a
o
i + = Π .  
Next suppose that the entrant has no export option. It decides whether to enter the 
home country by FDI or not and in the latter case it produces nothing. As our previous 
analysis has shown, the incumbent offers the wage  ˆ w to deter entry when  ˆ () ()
mc
ii ww Π≥ Π    25
and  ˆ ww > . Since we are assuming  0 u = , implying  0
* = w , the above condition reduces to 
ˆ () ( 0 )
mc






>=  ⇒  ˆ 3wa < . (30) 










>.  (31) 
When the above condition is satisfied, the incumbent offers  ˆ w and obtains the equilibrium 
profit when the entrant has no export option as follows:  
 
2 ˆˆ () ()
no m




= . (32) 
Finally we compare the equilibrium profits 
o
i Π  and 
no
i Π . To this end, let us set 
h CC ≡  for the comparison to be based on the same entry fee.  
Then 
on o
ii Π> Π if and only if  ˆ () 2 () 3 aw av − /< + /. Using (13), this becomes  
 
11 11







<.  (33) 
By combining (31) and (33), we must have    26
 
11 1 11 1







>> .  (34) 
Furthermore, since 
* (2 ) 0 c ya v w =−+ >   must hold, we need  2 av >   (note that we are 
considering the case of  0
* = w ). Then, inequalities (28) and (34) together with  2 av >  
become sufficient conditions for 
on o
ii Π> Π.  
Inequality (28) can be satisfied by taking a small  f C  and  0 > v . Also, letting 
() RHS a  and  () LHS a  denote the right hand and left hand sides of (34) as the functions of a, 
we obtain dRHS da dLHS da /= / and 
11 ( 0 )( 2 9 ) ( 2 1 )0 ( 0 ) LHS v RHS
γ −/ =/ − > =  (note here that 
1) γ > . Thus  () () LHS a RHS a >  for all  2 av > . Then we can take  0 C >  to satisfy inequality 
(34) as well as  2 av > .     Q.E.D.  
 
The intuition behind Proposition 4 can be explained as follows. First, consider when 
FDI is the only option to the foreign entrant. As we have shown in Proposition 1, the 
incumbent offers a high wage to keep the market structure monopoly instead of offering the 
minimum wage w, which results in a “more competitive” duopoly because the entrant enters 
and offers a low wage  ) (
* w v   as well at post-entry negotiations. For instance, in the 
parametric example given in Proposition 4, both the incumbent and the entrant face zero 
marginal cost,  0 ) ( = = w v w . 
On the other hand, when the foreign entrant has both options of FDI and export, the 
incumbent does not need to care about the effect that its wage offer may change the market 
structure: the domestic market always remains a duopoly whether the entrant enters the   27
market by FDI or exports. In particular, as shown Proposition 4, if the foreign entrant always 
chooses to export regardless of whatever wage the incumbent offers at the first stage, the 
incumbent has no choice but to offer the minimum wage 
* w  (this can be zero in the given 
example) at the first stage. Furthermore, in contrast to the case without export option, the 
marginal cost of the entrant is exogenously fixed at  0 > v . 
Thus the following trade-off arises: on the one hand, when the entrant has both FDI 
and export options the incumbent always faces duopolistic competition (implying lower 
market prices), but can offer the minimum wage (implying lower cost); on the other hand, 
when the entrant has only the FDI option, the incumbent raises the wage offer to deter entry 
in equilibrium, resulting in a combination of higher cost and higher market price. In other 
words, there is a wage raising effect (to deter entry) and a competition effect (a consequence 
of the export option). When the former effect dominates the latter one, as shown in 
Proposition 4, the incumbent can obtain higher profits when the entrant has both FDI and 
export options than when it has only the FDI option. Thus the incumbent may welcome the 
entrant to have multiple production options.   
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
We analyzed an entry deterrence model in which both the incumbent and the entrant 
face a labor union and hire unionized workers, and have shown that in equilibrium the 
incumbent offers a high wage to the union in order to deter entry of the entrant. Such a wage 
raising strategy is effective because it increases the outside-option value of the union at post-
entry negotiations with the entrant, which makes entry unattractive to the entrant, since now 
it anticipates that a high wage must be settled after entry. In contrast to the existing literature,   28
the incumbent succeeds in deterring entry by offering a high wage. Our results further 
explain the phenomenon that multinationals seek out non-unionized industries and regions to 
undertake FDI. For instance, the Toyota branch in Kentucky, USA, did not hire unionized 
workers in its early days; Wal-mart has about 28 independent branches and 26 joint ventures 
with more than 10,000 employees in China, but none is unionized (2003 figures).  
Even though wage offers are sequential in the present model, the mechanism that 
drives our results should remain the same in a simultaneous bargaining setup. The reason is 
that raising wages hurts the entrant more than the incumbent under certain conditions. As a 
consequence the potential entrant chooses not to enter, regardless if bargaining is sequential 
or simultaneous. 
  We also extended the basic model to include international trade, where a foreign firm 
considers entering the domestic market by choosing either FDI or exports. The presence of 
multiple production options of the entrant may depress the equilibrium wage offered by the 
incumbent. This implies that in unionized oligopolistic markets, if some firms can produce in 
a foreign country, wages in all firms will be driven down even though labor-management 
negotiations in different firms are separate and independent. Furthermore, the incumbent may 
become better off by the entrant having both FDI and export options as compared to the case 
when it has only the FDI option.   29
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